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Abstract 
Student achievement has been identified as important contributor to economic growth. This 
paper investigates the relationship between redistributive government activities and 
investment in human capital measured by student performance in international comparative 
tests in Mathematics and Science during the period 1980 to 2003. In fixed effects panel 
models, government consumption, government social expenditures, and the progressivity of 
the income tax system have negative effects on student achievement. The results are robust to 
a variety of model specifications, including models that condition on educational 
expenditures. Our best estimate indicates that increased government size by 10 percent 
reduces student achievement by 0.1 standard deviations.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The equity-efficiency quandary of the welfare state is usually attributed to perverse incentive 
effects in the labor market. The welfare state includes ‘unproductive’ government spending 
which reduces the return to work and is financed by distortionary taxes. Apparently, little 
evidence exists on the effect of welfare state arrangements on investment in human capital.  
 
The welfare state can be seen as a social insurance mechanism, see for example Sinn (1995). 
When the insurance terms for the insured improve, her incentives to invest in order to avoid 
capture are weakened. In a macroeconomic context, this moral hazard problem may have 
detrimental effects on investment in human capital, saving, and, ultimately, economic 
growth.
1
 Indeed, welfare state arrangements may also be seen as interventions in imperfect 
markets, working in the opposite direction. The evidence on public sector size and economic 
growth in empirical cross-country studies, however, indicates a negative relationship.
2
 Ehrlich 
and Zhong (1998) and Ehrlich and Kim (2007) look directly on investment in human capital, 
and find a negative effect of old-age pension benefits on secondary school enrolment rates, in 
particular for for developed countries.
3
 Using German data, Fossen and Glocker (2011) find 
that university enrollment is positively related to expected return to tertiary education. 
 
To our best knowledge, we are among the first to empirically investigate to what extent 
government redistribution activities affect individual investment in human capital. In this 
study, we approximate the former through three, partly overlapping measures of welfare state 
generosity: government consumption, social expenditures, and the progressivity of the tax 
system. We use achievement on international student tests, adjusted to facilitate comparability 
across countries and time, as measure of investment in human capital. Most of the existing 
empirical analyses on economic growth employ as a proxy of human capital some measure of 
quantity of education in the population. This is obviously a crude measure, and we follow 
Wössmann (2003) who argues that the number of quality-education-years varies across 
countries stronger than the mere duration of education, with which it might even be 
uncorrelated. Indeed, Hanushek and Kimko (2000) find that average student achievement in 
compulsory schooling is a much more sizable determinant of economic growth than years of 
                                                 
1
 In addition, Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer (2007) find that higher government consumption spending is related 
to less subjective well-being, perhaps through misallocation of resources or the inefficiencies generated through 
modern taxation schemes. 
2
 For example Fölster and Henrekson (2001), Romero-Avila and Strauch (2008) and Bergh and Karlsson (2010) 
find negative effects on growth of various measures of government size. Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmell (1999) 
distinguish between different types of taxes and spending categories, and find that distortionary taxation reduces 
growth whilst productive government expenditure enhances growth, a result in accordance with Romero-Avila 
and Strauch (2008). Agell, Ohlsson and Thoursie (2006) argue that the estimated relationships are not causal. 
3
 Zhang and Zhang (2004) find the opposite relationship. Ehrlich and Kim (2007) report that - not unsurprisingly 
in a growth context - the estimates are sensitive to whether the models condition on initial GDP or not.  
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education in the population. The strong effect of student achievement is confirmed by 
Jamison, Jamison and Hanushek (2007) and Hanushek and Wössmann (2009). 
 
We construct an unbalanced country panel that utilizes data on comparative international tests 
in Mathematics and Science for the age group 13-15 years and includes eight tests in the 
period 1980-2003 for a maximum of 79 countries. This panel allows the application of panel 
data estimation methods, while existing studies utilizing cross-country variation in student 
achievement are almost exclusively based either on one single cross-section of individual 
student performances in the same test of a single year or on a cross-section of country 
aggregates in test performance averaged over several years, as in, e.g., Hanushek and Kimko 
(2000), Jamison et al. (2007), and Hanushek and Wössmann (2009).
4
 In contrast, this paper 
exploits the panel structure in the test score data and estimates fixed effects models that 
account for unobserved heterogeneity across countries and common time-specific 
macroeconomic developments around the world. Our differences-in-differences approach 
suggests that more government redistribution activities exert an investment-lowering effect on 
students – be it either through the provision of goods (e.g. hospitals), but also through direct 
financial transfers to households (e.g. pension spending and active labor market policies), or 
when measured indirectly through the progressivity of the income tax schedule. The results 
are robust to a variety of model specifications, including models that condition on educational 
expenditures and the teacher-student ratio. The negative effect of welfare state generosity 
seems not to be mediated by resource use in education,  
 
The empirical analysis is preceded by a simple theoretical model that relates the size and the 
scope of the welfare state to human capital investment in terms of student effort. The 
insurance aspect of the welfare state manifests in a system that both reduces the risk related to 
future income and that redistributes from high income individuals to low income individuals. 
In traditional human capital models (Becker, 1964), where educational outcomes are 
determined by rational individuals weighting costs and benefits, increased redistribution of 
income is predicted to weaken the incentive to invest in education. The prediction of the effect 
of reduced idiosyncratic risk in future income is more complicated and ambiguous.  
 
This paper is related to the literature on educational effects of cash transfer programs in 
developing countries, which typically transfer money to poor families conditional on their 
investments in human capital. These evaluations provide clear evidence of positive effects on 
student enrollment and reduced dropout rates ( see, e.g., the review by Rawlings and Rubio, 
2005). However, such programs are not representative for the main portion of public 
expenditures because they include direct incentives for schooling. In addition, the recent 
                                                 
4
 The only exception seems to be Barro and Lee (2001a), who employ a panel of countries participating in 
international tests up to 1990 to estimate the effect of school inputs on student achievement. 
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evidence indicates that the cash transfer programs have no effect on student achievement 
(Ponce and Bedi, 2010; Behrman et al., 2009). 
  
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents the theoretical considerations on the 
investment effects of government redistributive activities and derives the testable hypothesis. 
Section 3 describes the international student tests data and our measure of adjusted average 
student performance, and introduces our three measures of welfare state generosity. Section 4 
presents the empirical model. Section 5 provides the main empirical findings and presents 
robustness tests related to potential omitted variables and results for subsamples. Section 6 
offers some concluding comments. 
 
 
2. Theoretical considerations 
 
Numerous papers have analyzed the relationship between taxation, uncertainty, and education 
incentives, including Levhari and Weiss (1974), Eaton and Rosen (1980), Hamilton (1987), 
Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), Andersson and Konrad (2003), Konrad and Spadaro (2006), 
and Poutvaara (2007). To clarify relevant mechanisms in a simple framework, without 
discussing optimal tax and welfare policy, we present a partial two-period model where 
students’ incentives in schools depends on exogenous redistribution of income and income 
uncertainty. At the outset we consider a model with one decision-maker - the student - but 
below we discuss its real-world applicability where other agents such as parents and teachers 
have an additional influence on student effort.  
 
Consider a life-time utility maximizing individual living in two periods. In period one, she 
invests in her human capital. The investment is modeled as the time devoted to education, Z, 
instead of leisure L, where Z + L is normalized to unity. Effort at school has opportunity costs 
in terms of foregone leisure, but is an investment in future income. In period two, she 
consumes her return to education. Assuming separability over time, the life-time utility in 
expectational terms is 
 
     E V u 1 Z rE U(C)     (1) 
 
where r is the discount rate, C is consumption, and utility functions u and U are concave. 
 
The welfare state is an institution that, in period two, transfers a fraction τ of the income from 
high income earners to individuals with low income, and thus reduces the consumption 
inequality in society. The uncertainty of the representative agent’s future income is captured 
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by the stochastic return of her education investment (ε), where E(ε) = 0 and   2Var    . We 
write consumption in period two as 
 
    C 1 y Z 1 y       (2) 
 
where the right hand side is the representative individual’s expected income after 
redistribution. The deterministic part of the income is the productivity that depends on effort 
in school, y(Z), with diminishing returns (    y Z 0, y Z 0   ). Because of income 
redistribution only a fraction (1–τ) of the consumption is related to own productivity, y, while 
the fraction τ is related to the average productivity in society, y . This formulation implies that 
transfer-related income component can be written as    y y Z 1   , and that individuals 
with the stochastic productivity y(1+ε) below (above) the societal mean productivity y  will 
have a positive (negative) transfer. Thus, the redistribution factor τ is an indicator of the 
generosity of the welfare state – which we capture later in the empirical analysis by three 
different, partly overlapping measures of redistributive government activity. For simplicity, 
the implicit taxation and transfer rules are not written down in the model.  
 
The individual maximizes equation (1) with respect to effort Z subject to constraint (2). The 
first order condition is 
 
         u 1 Z 1 y Z rE U C 1      .  (3) 
 
In optimum, the marginal cost of effort is equal to the expected marginal return to effort. To 
keep the analysis simple, we assume the quadratic utility function   22U C C C 2   . Then 
the first order condition (3) can be written as 
           2u 1 Z 1 y Z r 1 1 y Z y            . Calculation of the partial derivates 
is straightforward. Regarding the redistribution parameter τ, we have  
 
 
        2
u 1 ZdZ 1
1 y Z r y 1 y Z
d D 1
  
       
   
 (4) 
 
where               
22 2D 1 r 1 y Z u 1 Z y Z u 1 Z y Z 0             . The first term 
in the square bracket of equation (4) reflects that the incentive to invest in education is 
reduced when the extent of government redistribution,  rises and the return to education, r, 
declines. The sign of the second term depends on the relative income position ( y  - y) For 
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individuals with income below the mean y , more redistribution increases income and 
decreases the marginal utility of consumption, which partially lowers investment in education. 
For rich people, however, income decreases and thus the marginal utility of consumption 
increases, partially working in the direction of higher investment. In principle, this indirect 
effect of income redistribution may be so strong that its total effect on education investment is 
positive. However, for a representative individual with income close to mean income,
5
 the 
effect of redistribution on her optimal effort level is negative.  
 
Regarding uncertainty, it follows that 
 
     
2
2
1 ry Z y ZdZ
0
Dd
  
  

  (5) 
 
Increased uncertainty in the return to education, 2 , decreases investment in education. For 
example, the model of Levhari and Weiss (1974) predicts a similar relationship because 
individuals prefer less risky investments, all else equal.  
 
The result that volatility in the return to education reduces education investment is, however, 
not universally true, but depends on theoretical assumptions. While our model considers the 
investment in effort at school as an asset, education investment may also have similarities 
with real options. In a model where education investment is the time devoted to non-
compulsory education, and assuming that, after having left education for the labor market, the 
individual cannot return to education, Hogan and Walker (2007) show that investment is 
positively related to the uncertainty in the labor market: If a bad state of the labor market 
occurs, the individual can continue at school, but if a good state occurs, she can always switch 
to the labor market. As increased variability of the state of the labor market increases the 
upside payoff more than the downside payoff, the expected return to education investment 
rises. Jacobs (2007) reaches the same conclusion in a somewhat different model, in which he 
assumes that one can always leave the labor market again for education. Then increased 
variability in the return to education increases the probability that education investment is 
profitable at one point in time.  
 
In this model, termination of education is not regarded as a choice variable, as we analyze 
determinants of education outcome at the compulsory level of schooling. For this reason, the 
mechanisms described by Hogan and Walker (2007) and Jacobs (2007), which rely on 
duration of education as an individual choice variable, are not directly applicable. However, 
                                                 
5
 Since mean income seems to be higher than median income in all income distributions, it is more reasonable to 
assume that the representative individual has income below the mean than above the mean. 
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the probabilities of enrolling in post-compulsory education and of being able to choose among 
a large range of higher education institutions are typically related to preceding school 
performance at the compulsory level. Thus, low effort in compulsory schooling reduces the 
probability of attaining the real option inherent in higher education. 
 
So far, this model assumes that investment decisions are made by the student in isolation. In 
real life, however, parents and teachers influence their children’s and students’ effort levels 
through instructing and bargaining. This is an important aspect because parents and teachers 
are concerned about student effort at school, which may come about by altruistic, dynastic 
preferences of parents, and a mission or wage maximization of teachers. For reasons of 
simplicity, our model abstracts from these additional influences. In principle, however, the 
optimal effort level from the viewpoint of parents and teachers may be derived in the same 
way as the optimal student effort above, albeit some parameters of the model may be 
different. For example, children are likely to be more short-sighted than adults. In our model, 
their discount rate r may be lower, perhaps because of more pronounced hyperbolic 
discounting (see for example Laibson, 1997, or O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999). Then it 
follows from equation (3) that the optimal effort level is higher for parents and teachers than 
for students, which results in attempts of the first to positively influence effort of the latter. In 
addition, it follows from equation (4) that the response to the welfare state is positively related 
to r, making the optimal effort level from the parents’ and teachers’ point of view more 
responsive to income redistribution than the optimal effort level from the student’s point of 
view. Finally, the general comprehension in society of the importance of skills and 
knowledge, and the societal degree of risk aversion, also affect the parameters of the objective 
function. Thus, the actually observed student effort is likely to be a result of not only students’ 
behavior, but also parental and teacher behavior, and country-specific factors such as culture 
and population risk aversion.  
 
In our econometric analysis, we do not aim at determining specific parameters of the model 
above; dominating values and attitudes in a society are features which we account for by 
country fixed effects. Clearly, how changed macro-incentives are transmitted through schools, 
teachers, parents and students, cannot be revealed by the empirical strategy in this paper. 
Instead, the contribution of this paper is to make an attempt to empirically identify 
mechanisms through which governments’ welfare and redistributive policies may affect 
aggregated student achievement.  
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From our model, the implicit function of education investment is 
 
   21Z f , , y Z g, y   
  (6) 
 
where  21g g ,    captures the common effects of the welfare state. The investment Z 
decreases in y  because the utility function is concave, while the effect of the welfare state g is 
in general ambiguous. However, we regard redistribution of income, τ, as the dominating 
aspect of the welfare state, which has a negative effect on Z.  
 
Our testable hypothesis is that a more generous welfare state lowers individuals’ educational 
investments.  
 
 
3. Data 
 
3.1. International measures of student achievement 
We rely on comparative international tests of student achievement conducted by different 
international organizations. The International Association for the Evaluation of Educational 
Achievement (IEA) has been responsible for the largest number of such tests, among them the 
TIMSS tests, but also the OECD has developed a Programme for International Student 
Assessment (PISA).  
 
We construct a synthetic panel data set of the national averages of international tests on 
student performance covering a period of almost 25 years (1980 – 2003). Individual level data 
is not available for the tests prior to 1994/95, and the gain of exploiting micro-variation is 
limited in our setting because measures of government activities only vary at the national 
level. The tests cover the core subjects Reading, Mathematics and Natural Science separately, 
but we restrict our attention to student assessments in Mathematics and Science for several 
reasons. First, these two subjects have more similarities with each other than with Reading 
and are thus more suitable for constructing a synthetic panel. Second, reading skills are tested 
less regularly internationally, and even within the same test and year, potentially differ 
considerably by language. Third, performance in Mathematics and Natural Science are more 
likely to determine a country’s innovativeness in an economic growth context, as empirically 
tested in Hanushek and Wössmann (2008). Comparability of test results is also given in the 
age dimension, as all tests included are conducted on middle-aged students (13-15 years). 
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Choosing this age group has also the advantage that compulsory schooling still applies, 
mitigating selection out of education issues. The tests we utilize are described in Table 1.
6
 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
Recently, it has become common to report national averages based on Items Response Theory 
which weights the different questions by their difficulty (“Warm estimates”, Warm, 1989), 
and standardizes the scores such that the average across all students across all countries 
participating is 500 with standard deviation of 100. Particularly the PISA studies employ this 
methodology. With this approach, the average score of a particular country will depend on the 
achievement of the students in the other participating countries. Thus, the test scores for a 
particular country are not comparable over time since the composition of participating 
countries changes. More importantly, for the tests prior to 1991, “Warm estimates” were not 
calculated, so we have to rely on the share of correct answers for these tests.
7
  
 
To make the scores on the different international tests comparable on a common metric, we 
have re-scaled the average scores for each international test by the following procedure. First 
we calculate the average of the Mathematics and Science tests when both subjects are tested. 
Second, we standardize the average score for each test to have mean zero and standard 
deviation equal to unity for a “core” group of 15 countries. The “core” is defined as the 
countries that have participated in at least six out of the eight international tests reported in 
Table 1, namely Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Russia, Sweden, Thailand, UK, and USA.
8
 Third, we re-scale the 
scores for each of the remaining countries using the same parameters as for the “core” 
                                                 
6
 Even though all tests are in the fields ‘Mathematics’ and ‘Science’, they do not necessarily test the same 
cognitive skill: The IEA tests are related to common elements of school curricula across countries while IAEP is 
geared towards the curriculum in USA building on the national testing procedures developed by the National 
Assessment of Education Progress NAEP. The OECD PISA test has a more real-world approach and claims to 
assess the skills that are considered to be essential for full participation in the society. The high correlation 
coefficient between the (adjusted) test results among various test types suggests that these differences are not 
important with respect to measured student performance. For the 18 countries participating both in TIMSS 2003 
and PISA 2003, the correlation is 0.94, while the correlation between the average Science and Mathematics score 
in TIMSS-repeat 1999 and PISA 2000 is 0.87, and the corresponding number for IAEP 1991 and TIMSS 1995 is 
0.80. Interestingly, as can be seen from Figure 2 below, USA had its poorest performance in the IAEP test that 
was based on the US curriculum. 
7
 We have compared the Warm estimates and percent correct answers for the IEA tests in 1994-95 and 1998-99 
for which both measures are available. The correlation coefficients for Mathematics are 0.997 and 0.982, 
respectively, and for Science 0.994 and 0.977, respectively. Thus, the differences across countries do not seem to 
be influenced in any important way by the choice of scale. 
8
 More precisely, we standardize the score for those of the “core” countries that participated in the particular test. 
Out of the 15 “core” countries used to standardize the test scores, the data sources reports results for 11 countries 
in 1980-81, 12 in 1983-84, 8 in 1990-91, 15 in 1994-1995, 14 in 1998-99, 15 in OECD 2000, 13 in TIMSS 2003 
and 13 in OECD 2003. Only USA has test scores for all tests. 
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countries. Finally, since some countries participated in two parallel tests in 2003 (TIMSS and 
PISA), we calculate the average of both tests in 2003. 
 
Making the results from different tests comparable across time has been a challenge also for 
previous empirical studies. For example, Hanushek and Kimko (2000) calculate a measure of 
labor-force quality based on the percent of correct answers in international student 
achievement tests for the period 1965-1991. They adjust the mean for each test, but not the 
variance (except the linear scaling that follows from the adjustment of the mean). Adjusting 
the means across tests is crucial in their analysis because they subsequently calculate an 
aggregated 30-year average quality measure for each country. More recently, Hanushek and 
Wössmann (2009) utilize for their cross-section of national student performance tests from 
TIMSS, PISA and the IEA up to 2003 and, in addition to adjusting the means, they correct the 
dispersion of each single test in a similar way as ours.
9
  
 
Figure 1a shows that the density of our measure of student achievement across the 15 “core” 
countries observations is close to the normal distribution. The density for all observations 
presented in Figure 1b has a long left tail, illustrating that some countries, mostly developing 
countries that participate less frequently in international tests, have low student achievement.  
  
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figures 1a and 1b about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
In a model with country-specific fixed effects, identification is only based on within-country 
variation. Figure 2 shows the development of test averages over time for the “core” countries. 
The figure indicates that there are some systematic changes. For example, the relative 
achievement in the more neo-liberal Western economies USA, Canada, and UK increased 
during the 1990s, while the achievement declined in Israel and in the transition countries 
Russia and Hungary. Some countries perform consistently better than others. For example, 
Italy performs below average and Netherlands performs above average in each test. However, 
Figure 3 shows that there is quite some variation in the change in student achievement, 
although the variation is lower than that for the distribution in levels of achievement.
10
 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figures 2 and 3 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
                                                 
9
 Hanushek and Wössmann (2009) use as their “core” countries 13 OECD countries with “stable education 
systems”, but they do not report which countries. 
10
 In Figure 3, only observations with at most eight years interval are utilized. 
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Appendix Table A1 presents the 72 countries participation in the relevant international tests. 
16 countries have only conducted one test, and will thus not contribute to the identification in 
models with fixed country effects. The table shows that the test score typically is low in 
developing countries, and that the within-country variation is relatively high.
11
 
 
3.2. Independent variables: welfare state generosity and controls 
Our focal determinant of student performance in this analysis is the generosity of the welfare 
state which is made operational in three ways: Firstly, we employ general government 
consumption spending (in percentage of GDP), obtained from the WDI (2007) database of the 
World Bank, a widely used measure of government production of goods and services that has 
been employed in various cross-country growth studies (Fölster and Henrekson, 2001, Agell 
et al., 2006) and happiness studies (Bjørnskov, Dreher, and Fischer, 2007 and 2008). 
Government consumption excludes financial transfers to single households, but includes the 
government production of goods and services, which are mostly financed by taxes. For 
example, government consumption spending includes expenses for hospitals, infrastructure, 
public transport, and culture – state expenses which all relax the income constraint on private 
households’ consumption now and in the future. In addition, given that most publicly 
provided goods are financed through progressive tax systems, they entail a consumption 
redistribution aspect. Following the traditional public finance literature, we will refer to this 
measure as ‘government consumption’.  
 
Secondly, we use public sector social expenditures (in percentage of GDP) that are obtained 
from OECD Social Expenditure database (SOCX) and include aggregated public 
expenditures of all government tiers.
12
 This measure captures direct transfers from 
government institutions to single households, including “benefits to, and financial 
contributions targeted at, households and individuals in order to provide support during 
circumstances which adversely affect their welfare, provided that the provision of the benefits 
and financial contributions constitutes neither a direct payment for a particular good or service 
nor an individual contract or transfer” (OECD, 2007, p. 7). OECD defines expenditures as 
‘social’ if they satisfy two criteria: first, they have to intend a social purpose, and, second, 
these programs must be based on either inter-personal redistribution or compulsory 
participation (OECD, 2007, p. 8). They take the form of “cash benefits (e.g. pensions, income 
support during maternity leave, and social assistance payments), social services (e.g. 
                                                 
11
 The within-country variation tends to be high in countries with declining test scores such as Bulgaria and 
Hungary. Singapore had an exceptionally high score in TIMSS 1995. 
12
 The OECD defines expenditures as ‘public’ (as opposed to being ’private’) when institutions of the ‘General 
Government’ control the relevant financial flows. The ‘General Government’ in this context includes different 
levels of government and social security funds. This definition of ‘public’ includes, often by tradition, transfers 
by compulsory social insurances and social assistance schemes (see also OECD 2007, p.8-10). 
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childcare, care for the elderly and disabled) and tax breaks with a social purpose (e.g. tax 
expenditures towards families with children, or favorable tax treatment of contributions to 
private health plans)” (ibidem, p. 7), excluding the administrative costs of executing them.  
 
By employing separate components of public social expenditure, we are able to differentiate 
government transfers by social policy area; pension payments, unemployment benefits, active 
labor market policy spending, family allowances, health care (service) spending, housing 
subsidies, and ‘other spending’. Table 2 provides an overview of spending components. The 
major population is, in principle, entitled to all those spending programs so that each may 
exert an independent effect of its own. The correlation coefficient between government 
consumption spending and total social spending is equal to 0.67 in our sample. 
 
Figure 4 presents within-country variation in total social expenditures as a share of GDP for 
the “core” countries. There is a tendency of increased social expenditures during the period of 
investigation. The average share of social expenditures in Figure 4 increases from 0.17 in 
1980 to 0.19 in 2003.
13
 The Netherlands is the only country which reduced social 
expenditures, while Japan has the largest growth. Notice that social expenditures as a share of 
GDP serve as automatic stabilizers and, thus, typically shrink in a boom and expand in a 
recession. Thus, it is important to include GDP in the empirical model in order to avoid 
identification on variation in national income. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
Table 3 presents some descriptive statistics on government consumption in the world sample, 
and total social expenditures for OECD countries, including its single components. The 
variance in social expenditures is slightly higher than that for government consumption, both 
overall and within countries. The within country variation, for which we identify the effects 
on student achievement, constitutes 7-8 percent of the overall variance. Pension spending is 
the largest component of social expenditures, followed by public health spending.   
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
                                                 
13
 For all 29 OECD countries included in the empirical analyses, social expenditures increase from 17 percent of 
GDP in 1980 to 21 percent in 2003. 
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The third measure of the generosity of the welfare state that we employ is an index of income 
tax rate progressivity developed by the Fraser Institute (Gwartney and Lawson, 2002). The 
index constitutes an income-bracket adjusted marginal tax rate levied in the highest income 
bracket in one country, adjusted for the lowest income threshold for this income bracket. The 
redistributive impact of a given tax rate depends on the financial threshold the rate applies on. 
Since the index is adjusted for threshold effects it facilitates comparability of the marginal top 
income tax rate across countries and time. Progressive taxes are redistributive as they relax the 
financial constraint on poor households relative to richer households, but also since they 
finance provision of goods and services that equalize consumption patterns between the rich 
and the poor. The index of income tax progressivity ranges from 0 to 10, with higher values 
representing a higher top tax rate, and, thus, more redistribution of income. Between 1970 and 
2000, data have been collected every five years, and annually from 2000. We have linearly 
interpolated missing values to maximize the number of observations in our regressions.  
 
The regression-sample within-country variation for our three measures of welfare state 
generosity is presented in Appendix Table A1. For countries with relatively large variation in 
one or two variables, the variation of the third variable is often similar to the average. For 
example, during the 1990s Korea increased rapidly both social expenditures and the 
progressivity of the tax system, but without changing government consumption. On the other 
hand, in Ireland and the UK government consumption and tax progressivity declined 
markedly in the 1990s without much change in social expenditures. Thus, the subsample of 
countries that contribute most to the within-country variation in the empirical analysis will 
differ across the three measures.  
 
Annual GDP and population data are taken from the WDI 2007 database. Adult education 
attainment is taken from Barro and Lee (2001b), which are available on a quinquennial basis 
up to the year 2000; missing values prior to 2000 have been linearly interpolated. We use the 
3-years lag of the percentage of the population over age 25 with secondary school attained in 
order to include also the international tests after the year 2000 in the empirical analysis. In 
some robustness tests, we also use current data on primary school educational expenditures 
(% GDP) and pupil-teacher ratios from the World Bank. Again, we linearly interpolate the 
variables when there are missing values for at most five years.
14
 
 
 
  
                                                 
14
 From 1990 on, these data have roughly been collected on an annual basis. 
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4. Model specification and identification 
 
We estimate the following model for student achievement Z of country i in year t 
 
1 2 3 4log( / ) log( )      it it it it it i t itZ g GDP POP POP EDU  (7) 
 
where git is the measure of the welfare state generosity, while GDP per capita (GDP/POP) is 
the proxy for mean income y , both derived from equation (6) in section 2. Family 
characteristics as parental income and education have strong effects in micro studies of 
student achievement, which is why we also include the share of adult population with at least 
some secondary education (EDU). Since we measure GDP in per capita terms, we also 
employ population size (POP). The time fixed effects t  account for macro-developments 
common to all countries, e.g. financial market crises and global recessions, but also for the 
fact that most of the independent variables have positive trends.
15
 Country-specific fixed 
effects 
i  account for time-invariant differences between countries.  
 
In our theoretical model, it is assumed that it is the expected welfare state arrangements in the 
future that affect educational investment decisions today. We argue that the contemporaneous 
level of government redistribution activities might be the best proxy for the expectations in 
our framework. The average spending level over time that may persist due to country’s 
institutions is captured by the country fixed effects. However, it is the short-term within-
country changes, conditional on GDP and population size, that drive the results in the 
difference-in-difference model. As educational production is cumulative, expectations of 
students and parents at earlier grades in the past are important for observed achievement today 
at the age of 13-15 years. Thus, contemporaneous levels of government redistribution are to 
some extent a leaded measure for the real decisions. However, we will also investigate the 
robustness of the results by using five-years moving averages in the independent variables in 
some model specifications. 
 
Including country fixed effects in the model, which amounts to a difference-in-differences 
specification, is essential in order to interpret the estimated relationships. The school systems 
vary greatly across countries, for example with respect to school starting age and early 
tracking of students. In addition there might be differences across countries in culture for 
learning, risk aversion, and labor market institutions that are important for students’ 
                                                 
15
 Notice that including time-specific effects may influence the interpretation of the results, as we discuss later. 
The scaling of the test scores makes the scores comparable over time so that, by including time fixed effects, the 
model in essence draws inference on which other countries that participated on the different test and year. Thus, 
we also report results where the time-specific effects are replaced by a simple trend.  
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investment decisions. However, all these characteristics change slowly at the national level, 
and are thus to a major extent captured by the country fixed effects. 
 
One must, of course, nevertheless be careful in interpreting the estimated relationship between 
welfare state generosity and student performance as causal. As always for the difference-in-
differences approach, the main source of concern is that important variables that vary over 
time in a way that is correlated with the variable of interest are missing from the analysis. We 
investigate the robustness of our results in several ways. First, we employ different measures 
of welfare state generosity which have different within-country variation. Second, we 
investigate whether omitted variables are likely to drive the results by expanding some models 
to include educational spending, unemployment, and the age composition of the population. 
Third, we estimate separate models for OECD countries that arguable are more homogenous 
that the world sample. All the independent variables are of course measured with some error, 
which in the standard case will bias the estimated effects towards zero.  
 
Finally, there might in principle be reverse causality; public policy might respond on 
dissatisfactory school performance. However, even if welfare reforms often are related to poor 
economic performance and problems in the labor market, unsatisfactory performance of 
schools is to our knowledge not used as an argument for reduced generosity of welfare state 
arrangements. 
 
 
 
5. Empirical Results 
 
5.1. Government consumption 
Table 4 presents results for government consumption spending including up to 72 countries 
and 232 observations. The first column simply presents the correlation between student 
achievement and government consumption spending as share of GDP. There is no 
unconditional correlation. Column (2) includes the control variables GDP per capita, adult 
educational attainment w.r.t. secondary education, population size, and time-specific fixed 
effects. The number of observations drops due to missing observations for adult education for 
some countries. As expected, we find strong positive effects of GDP per capita and adult 
education. The positive income effect mirrors Hanushek and Kimko (2000) who report a 
positive effect of student achievement on economic growth, and is in accordance with micro 
evidence on the effect of parental income on student performance. However, the result for 
GDP is not in accordance with our theoretical model where the utility function is concave. 
The positive effect of adult educational attainment mirrors results from previous micro-
econometric studies.  
 15 
 
 
The conditional effect of government consumption spending in column (2) is negative, as 
expected, appears sizeable and is significant at the 1 percent level. Thus, conditional on 
income, a small public sector is favorable as it increases student performance, and conditional 
on public sector size, students in rich and well-educated countries perform better than those 
living in poor and low-educated countries. When the share of government consumption 
increases by 0.1 log-points (approximately 10 percent) student achievement declines by 0.15 
“core” country standard deviations. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
Columns (3) to (5) of Table 4 present models with country fixed effects that mitigate a 
potential omitted variable problem.
16
 However, including country fixed effects in addition to 
year effects in column (3) does not change the point estimates of GDP and adult education 
attainment much compared to column (2), although the standard errors are twice as large as in 
the model with only time fixed effects (column (2)). On the other hand, the estimate of 
government consumption is small and insignificant.  
 
In these fixed effects models, our variable of interest becomes sometimes insignificant so that 
identification of its effects needs to be discussed. The relative large standard errors in the 
models with country fixed effects in columns (3) to (5) may indicate that the within-country 
variations in student achievement and government consumption are too small for statistical 
identification. Notably, the OLS R
2
 is as high as 0.94. However, it may equally be that it is the 
time-specific effects that complicate identification, e.g. in column (3). The purpose of the 
scaling of the test scores described above is to make the scores comparable over time. In 
consequence, with time-specific fixed effects, the model in essence draws inference on the 
change in composition of participating countries in a particular test and year. Our motivation 
for including year effects is that, on average, all the independent variables have positive 
trends. Indeed, while the p-value of joint significance of the time-specific fixed effects is 0.02 
in the model in column (3) in Table 4, the p-value is only 0.13 when a simple trend is added. 
For this reason, we replace in column (4) the time fixed effects with such a time trend. The 
coefficient of the trend variable is negative, indicating a positive trend in the other 
independent determinants, as expected. The OLS R
2
 appears only marginally lowered, while 
the within-R
2
 is clearly reduced. Interestingly, the effect of government consumption spending 
is significantly negative in this specification. We conclude that it is not unobservable, time-
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 The number of observations is reduced in the fixed effects models because only countries with at least two 
observations can contribute to the identification.  
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invariant country-specific factors that let the effect of government size appear insignificant in 
column (3), but the handling of the variation over time. 
 
What kind of within-country variation in student achievement and government consumption is 
driving the results? Is it country-specific trends, or fluctuations around the trends? Figure 2 
above suggests that some countries exhibit a trend-like development in student achievement. 
To investigate this question, column (5) in Table 4 expands the model with country-specific 
time trends. Then the effect of government consumption increases to about the same 
magnitude as in the model without country-specific fixed effects in column (2), and becomes 
highly significant again. Thus, it seems like it is the variation around country-specific trends 
that accounts for the association between government consumption and student achievement. 
This result is independent of whether the model includes time-specific fixed effects or not, 
and the increase in significance from the model in column (3) to the one in column (5) is not 
related to the fact that the number of countries that contribute to identification is necessarily 
smaller in the latter model. 
 
In columns (6) through (8) of Table 4 we estimate the same models restricting our sample to 
OECD countries, to ease comparison with Table 5 below. We define the subsample of OECD 
countries by membership in the year 2000, but test later the robustness of our results for post-
communist period effects (see section 5.5.). In the OECD sample, the effect of government 
consumption is significant in the model without country fixed effects (column (6)), with its 
coefficient size appearing independent of whether country fixed effects and country-specific 
trends are included in the model or not (columns (7) and (8)). The effect of -1 is remarkably 
similar to that in column (4) - the preferred model for the whole world sample. In columns (7) 
and (8), however the standard errors are relatively large. Nevertheless, the variation that 
drives these results appears to differ between OECD countries and non-OECD countries. 
While the variation across country-specific trends aids identifying a strong effect for the 
whole sample, inclusion of trends in the OECD sample does not influence the effect of 
government size.   
 
In sum, we identify a negative impact of government consumption spending on student 
achievement. This evidence is in accordance with our hypothesis that a more generous welfare 
system generates disincentives for educational investment. The result indicates that when 
government consumption spending increases by 0.1 log-points, student achievement is 
reduced by about 0.1 “core” country standard deviations. 
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5.2. Social expenditures 
Table 5 presents results for government total social expenditures, measured as share of GDP, 
available for 29 OECD countries, resulting in a sample of 124 observations. Column (1) 
shows that the unconditional correlation between welfare transfers to households and student 
achievement is negative and significant at 5 percent level. Inclusion of co-variates even 
increases the effect of social expenditures both in terms of magnitude and statistical 
significance (column (2)).
17
 Also within OECD countries, there are positive impacts of GDP 
and adult education attainment. When country fixed effects are included (column (3)), the 
coefficient of social expenditures is still significant at 5 percent level, but larger in magnitude. 
Interestingly, it is of similar size as the point estimate of government consumption spending in 
Table 4. Column (4) shows that the results are not sensitive to whether the model includes 
time-specific fixed effects or a common time trend. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
However, when including country-specific time trends, the attainment-lowering impact of 
social expenditures completely disappears (column (5) of Table 5). We conclude that it is 
country-specific trends that drive the results, which indicates that in the OECD sample there 
are some systematic medium-term changes in government policy that students and parents 
react on.  
 
In the last part of Table 5 we distinguish between different components of social expenditures 
relating to specific social policy areas such as health, family care, labor market, pension 
system, etc. In column (6) we replace total social expenditures with all its various 
components. All components have a negative sign as expected, except for ‘health care 
spending’, ‘other spending’, and ‘family allowances’. Notably, the spending category ‘other 
spending’ is of a rather ‘kitchen-sink’ nature so that its estimate is not easy to interpret. The 
positive effect of family allowances is in fact significant at 10 percent level, which may 
indicate that relaxing parents’ budget constraints in the poorest families may have an 
attainment-increasing effect on their children.  
 
The positive correlations among the different social expenditure components may contribute 
to their heterogeneous and mainly insignificant effects in column (6). Thus, we have run 
regressions including each of the components separately. In all cases, the effects are negative, 
except for family allowances. Columns (7) and (8) in Table 5 report the two single cases of a 
                                                 
17
 The sample is smaller in column (2) than in column (1) of Table 5 because adult educational attainment is not 
available for Luxembourg. 
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minum statistical significance at the 10 percent level. .Both payments on active labor market 
policies and pension spending lower students’ test scores, each with significance at 1 percent. 
Since the former constitutes only a small part of total social expenditures, the negative effect 
of social expenditures in columns (1) to (4) seems to a large part to be driven by pension 
spending.
18
  
 
Taken all together, Table 5 shows that the effect of social spending in OECD countries is in 
accordance with the hypothesis that government redistribution activities create disincentives 
to human capital investment. Among the different types of welfare transfers, it is pension 
benefits that contribute most to this effect. Possibly, because of path dependency in policy-
making, current changes in spending on pensions may have a strong predictive power on 
governments’ future pension system policies, which are strongly redistributive in nature: in 
most developed countries, on the one hand, pensions systems guarantee an income-
independent minimum rent to every contributor, while, on the other hand, they place a cap on 
the maximum rent, equalizing rent incomes in the non-active elderly population.  
 
5.3. Tax progressivity 
Table 6 uses the same model specifications as Table 4, but replaces the government 
consumption variable with a 10-point scale index of the top marginal income tax rate, adjusted 
for the income bracket, a measure of progressivity of the income tax system. For this welfare 
state generosity measure, there is a negative correlation with student achievement for the 
whole sample (column (1)), but the effect disappears when we include the control variables 
national income, population size and educational attainment in the population (column (2)). 
However, in the models with country-specific fixed effects in columns (3) and (4), the tax 
progressivity coefficient is significant at five and 10 percent levels, respectively. Column (5) 
suggests that the development of tax income progression over time is not captured by country-
specific time trends, as the coefficient estimate as similar to those in columns (3) and (4), 
which exclude such country-specific trends. When the index of income tax progressivity 
increases by one standard deviation, which is about 2.5 points, student achievement is reduced 
by 0.21 adjusted “core” country standard deviations.  
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
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 We are unable to exclude the possibility that more public expenditures on pension may equally proxy for a 
large body of civil servants. In this case, the prospects of becoming a civil servant with high job security and 
generous retirement options may equally lower effort in mandatory schooling.  
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How the effect of the variable of interest changes when we alter the model specification varies 
greatly between the government spending, social transfers and tax progressivity models 
(Tables 4-6), which indicates that the variables have very different features.
19
 Nevertheless, 
the main result for all measures of welfare state generosity is that they tend to reduce student 
achievement. The quantitative effects of the adjusted top tax rate are difficult to compare to 
the other variables since using an index variable makes quantitative predictions difficult.  
 
Regarding OECD countries, there is a strong negative effect of tax progressivity (column (6)) 
when the model does not include country fixed effects, but the effect disappears when country 
fixed effects are added. This finding is similar to the pattern observed for government 
consumption spending in the OECD countries (columns (6) to (8) of Table 4). In Table 6, it 
most possibly suggests that the conditional within-country variation of tax progressivity is too 
small to identify a statistically significant effect. Overall, using a measure of tax progressivity, 
we find convincing support for our hypothesis that student learning efforts decrease as the 
redistributive activities of the government expand.  
 
5.4. Generosity of the welfare system 
The sizes of government consumption and social spending, expressed in percentage of GDP, 
are commonly viewed as proxies for the generosity of redistributive activities by the 
government. However, in principle, generosity of social transfers can be more directly 
assessed when values per recipient of social benefits in place of per capita numbers are 
employed. However, precise information on number of recipients is not easily available. Thus, 
we analyze the effects of welfare state generosity by estimating models with those selected 
components of social expenditures for which appropriate population shares serving as proxies 
for number of recipients are available. We employ either the share of elderly in the population 
or the share of unemployed in the active population. Indeed, omission of beneficiary measures 
might have biased our previous results as the spending estimates might capture population 
composition effects: simple correlations of the spending measures with the number of their 
specific beneficiaries are large.
20
  
 
In Table 7 we present results for models with measures of the number of recipients included. 
Taken all together, the results are not sensitive to inclusion of proxies for the number of 
beneficiaries. Pension spending and active labor market policy spending still exert a student 
performance lowering impact when the share of elderly and the unemployment rate, 
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 The correlation coefficient between government consumption spending (log) and the top marginal tax rate 
index is -0.44, and for the social spending (log) in OECD countries -0.30. Please note that financing of 
government activities also occurs through corporate taxation and indirect taxes on e.g. consumption goods. 
20
 The correlation coefficients between unemployment spending and unemployment rate is 0.51 and between 
pension spending and the share of the population above the age of 60 is 0.86. The correlation between active 
labor market policy spending and the unemployment rate is only 0.17. 
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respectively, are included in the model (columns (1) and (2)), while the effects of 
unemployment and health care spending remain insignificant (columns (3) and (4)). The 
similarity of the coefficients on the spending variables with the original models reported in 
Table 5 suggests that the bias from using spending measured per GDP (conditional on 
population size) in place of per recipient is rather small. Regarding pension spending in 
column (1), the significance level is reduced to 5 percent when the share of elderly is 
included. While the share of the population above 60 years of age is insignificant, the test of 
joint significance clearly suggests that both variables are jointly related to student 
achievement. The effect of active labor market policies spending is equally lowered in 
significance (now at 5 percent level) when the unemployment rate is included (column (2)), 
while this time the test of joint significance clearly suggests that only one of the variables is 
related to student achievement.  
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
5.5. Robustness analyses 
The student test scores from the 1980s are not average results for jointly conducted 
Mathematics and Science tests as those achievement tests in the post-1990 period, but 
separate tests on the two subjects. Another reason for restricting the sample to the post-1990 
period is that many argue that test designs and test procedures have improved over time. 
Therefore, the dependent variable may incorporate a larger measurement error in the 1980s 
than in later periods. Table 8 presents results for regressions on the subsample for the 1990-
2003 period. Columns (1)–(3) in the table show that the coefficients of all three measures of 
welfare state - government consumption spending, social transfers, and income tax 
progressivity - are in fact larger in this subsample compared to the full sample that includes 
the pre-1990 tests, although the effect of government consumption spending is still 
insignificant in the model with time-specific fixed effects. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 8 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
It might also be argued that government spending and social spending are proxies for 
educational expenditures. Notice, however, that the typical finding in the literature, both from 
studies using single country data and international data, is that educational expenditures and 
teacher-student ratios have at most a minor effect on student performance (e.g. Hanushek and 
Luque 2003). If, still, educational expenditures or education quality have a positive effect on 
 21 
 
student achievement, their exclusion will bias the effect of welfare state size in our previous 
models since these variables are likely to be positively correlated. Thus, our previous 
coefficient estimates in Tables 4 to 6 may rather be biased downwards in absolute terms, 
providing a lower bound of welfare state effect. In columns (4) to (9) of Table 8 we add to our 
model educational expenditures per pupil in primary schools as a percentage of GDP and 
pupil–teacher ratios in primary schools from the World Bank education database.21 The 
effects of educational expenditures and pupil–teacher ratio appear insignificant in all but one 
specification. Most important, the effects of government consumption, social expenditures, 
and the progressivity of the income tax system remain qualitatively unchanged when these 
measures of resource use and school quality in primary education are accounted for. Overall, 
we find no indication that the generosity of the welfare system and government public goods’ 
creation proxies previously unobserved educational expenses or school quality.  
 
Lastly, we investigate whether the choice of functional form of the empirical model is 
important. One may argue that it is not short-term fluctuations in the independent variables 
that are important, but the development in the medium or long term. We have carried out 
identical regressions as reported in Tables 4-6 using 5-year moving averages of the 
independent variable in place of using current values. The findings for government 
consumption spending appear partly sensitive to the choice of time window, although a robust 
and large performance lowering effect at the 1 percent level remains if country-specific time 
trends are included. The effect of social spending appears insignificant throughout, albeit their 
coefficients prevail in size and direction. In contrast, the student performance lowering impact 
of active labor market policies spending and pension benefit spending is strongly supported.
22
 
Estimation of 5-year moving averages corroborates the results for progressivity of the tax 
system for OECD countries (analogously to Table 6), while the coefficients for the full 
country sample are now smaller and insignificant, albeit all with negative signs.
23
 Overall, the 
results for welfare state generosity appear insensitive to changes in model specification and 
sample selection.    
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 For secondary education, the number of observations was insufficient. The correlation coefficients of per pupil 
spending in primary education with our government consumption and social spending exceed well 0.5, while 
those with pupil-teacher ratio in primary education are -0.76 and -0.29, respectively. 
22
 Significant at least at the 5 percent level. In addition, housing subsidies appear now conducive to student 
performance, (at the 5 percent level) in a similar manner as family allowances in the current value model. 
23
 We have also investigated the sensitivity to the assumed functional form in logs. The analogous results for 
government consumption in Table 4 are similar and show, again, the importance of country-specific time trends 
to identify the effect of size of welfare state in the world sample. In contrast, the coefficients for social spending 
in the OECD become insignificant, suggesting a model misspecification. Results for single social spending 
components are, however, comparable to the results in Table 5. 
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6. Conclusion 
The recent publications of international comparative student achievement tests such as PISA 
and TIMSS have spurred the debate on quality of public education in many countries. While 
most of the discussion has been centered around educational resource use and school 
organization, analyses of macro incentives implicit in government’s economic policies are 
limited.  
 
This paper studies the relationship between welfare state generosity and individuals’ 
investment in human capital during compulsory education. We estimate differences-in-
differences models accounting for unobserved country heterogeneity for the period 1980-2003 
using international test scores in mathematics and science made comparable across testing 
institutions and test years. The results clearly suggest that the generosity of the welfare state 
has a deteriorating impact on student performance. Both the effect of government 
consumption spending per capita, the degree of progressivity of the income tax system, and, 
for OECD countries, the size of direct social transfers to households have a significant 
negative effect on student achievement. For the monetary measures of government activity we 
find that an increase by 10 percent reduces student achievement by about 0.1 standard 
deviations.   
  
However, one needs to be cautious when drawing policy implications from our empirical 
results: the fact that findings in form of econometric ‘point estimates’ always must be 
interpreted as marginal, ‘local’ changes. Furthermore, our findings are for high- and middle-
high income countries only – whether similar results can be found in other contexts remains 
an open question. 
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Table 1. Data sources description 
Year 
Test 
organization 
Acronym Test subjects  
Test age 
or grade 
Countries Data source 
1980-81 IEA SIMS Mathematics 13 years 
3 in 1980 
14 in 1981 
Lee and Barro (1997) 
Travers and Westbury (1989) 
1983-85 IEA SISS Science 14 years 
11 in 1983 
11 in 1984 
1 in 1985 
Postlethwaite and Wiley (1992) 
1990-91 IAEP IAEP 
Mathematics 
and Science 
13 years 
2 in 1990 
17 in 1991 
Lee and Barro (1997) 
1994-95 IEA TIMSS 
Mathematics 
and Science 
Grade 8 
4 in 1994 
36 in 1995 
timss.bc.edu/ 
1998-99 IEA TIMSS-repeat 
Mathematics  
and Science 
Grade 8 
6 in 1998 
31 in 1999 
timss.bc.edu/ 
2000-02 OECD PISA 2000 
Mathematics 
and Science 
15 years 
32 in 2000 
9 in 2002 
www.pisa.oecd.org 
2002-03 IEA TIMSS 2003 
Mathematics 
and Science 
Grade 8 
7 in 2002 
38 in 2003 
timss.bc.edu/ 
2003 OECD PISA 2003 
Mathematics 
and Science 
15 years 40 in 2003 www.pisa.oecd.org 
Note. For some countries separate scores are reported for different parts of the country. We have calculated mean 
country averages by using population as weight. IEA (except the 1983/84 test) and IAEP tests are conducted in 
the fall in the southern hemisphere and in the spring in the northern hemisphere. PISA 2000 originally only 
included five non-OECD countries, but nine additionally non-OECD countries conducted the same test in 2002. 
 
 
Table 2. Types of social expenditures in OECD countries 
Policy area Programs 
Old-age Pensions, early retirement pensions, home-help, residential services for the 
elderly.  
Survivors Pensions and funeral payments.  
Incapacity-related Care services, disability benefits, benefits accruing from occupational injury 
and accident legislation, employee sickness payments.  
Health Spending on in- and out-patient care, medical goods, prevention.  
Family Child allowances and credits, childcare support, income support during 
leave, sole parent payments.  
Active labour market policies Employment services, training youth measures subsidised employment, 
employment measures for the disabled.  
Unemployment Unemployment compensation, severance pay, early retirement for labour 
market reasons. 
Housing Housing allowances and rent subsidies. 
Other social policy areas Non-categorical cash benefits to low-income households, other social 
services; i.e. support programmes such as, food subsidies, which are 
prevalent in some non-OECD countries.  
Note. Source is Social Expenditure 1980-2003, OECD 2007, p.8. 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics of government consumption and social expenditures 
 
Obser-
vations 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
overall 
Standard 
deviation 
within 
countries 
Minimum 
value  
Maximum 
value  
General government consumption 
spending, percent of GDP 
232 
(All) 
17.65 5.39 1.46 5.69  41.47 
General government consumption 
spending, percent of GDP 
124 
(OECD) 
18.90 4.22 1.05 10.08 29.62 
Public sector social expenditures, 
percent of GDP 
124 
(OECD) 
19.62 5.61 1.62 2.8 32.5 
Active labor market policy 
spending, share of GDP 
120 
(OECD) 
0.61 0.44 0.20 0 2.2 
Public health spending, share of 
GDP 
124 
(OECD) 
5.56 1.28 0.55 1.4 8.3 
Family allowance spending, share 
of GDP  
124 
(OECD) 
1.90 1.08 0.31 0 4.1 
Unemployment benefit spending, 
share of GDP 
120 
(OECD) 
1.17 0.90 0.44 0 4.4 
Pension spending,  
share of GDP 
124 
(OECD) 
6.38 2.76 0.76 0.6 12.8 
Housing spending,  
share of GDP  
102 
(OECD) 
0.42 0.39 0.17 0 1.8 
Other social spending,  
share of GDP 
99 
(OECD) 
4.00 1.38 0.64 1.50 8.90 
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Table 4. The effect of government consumption on student achievement 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Gov. consumption spending, 
percent of GDP (log) 
0.107 -1.462** -0.650 -1.021* -1.596** -1.100** -1.060 -1.086 
(0.414) (0.378) (0.509) (0.486) (0.558) (0.377) (0.945) (1.551) 
GDP per capita (log) 
- 1.502** 1.234* 1.123* 2.056** 0.483 1.451 3.735* 
 (0.213) (0.485) (0.475) (0.748) (0.292) (0.698) (1.473) 
Percentage secondary school 
attained among adults (log) 
- 0.763** 0.510 0.736* 2.238** 1.268** 0.424 1.454 
 (0.292) (0.409) (0.371) (0.836) (0.271) (0.639) (1.052) 
Population size (log) 
- 0.040 2.279* 1.515 -8.492 -0.048 5.221* -11.04 
 (0.77) (1.046) (0.978) (6.758) (0.62) (2.241) (8.728) 
Trend 
- - - -0.041** - - - - 
   (0.014)     
         
Country fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County specific trends No No No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 232 208 197 197 187 128 128 124 
No of countries 72 59 48 48 43 28 28 26 
Sample All All All All All OECD OECD OECD 
R
2 
0.0003 0.455 0.943 0.937 0.982 0.301 0.851 0.932 
R
2
 (within)
 
- - 0.222 0.133 0.740 - 0.298 0.679 
Note. Absolute standard errors in parentheses, +, * and ** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level, 
respectively. 
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Table 5. The effect of social expenditures on student achievement 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Gov. social expenditures, 
percent of GDP (log) 
-
0.488** 
-
0.670** 
-0.997* -
0.899+ 
0.505 - - - 
(0.223) (0.230) (0.464) (0.457) (1.070)    
GDP per capita (log) - 0.717* 0.523 1.508+ 6.500** -0.686 0.546 -0.008 
 (0.315) (0.895) (0.863) (2.355) (1.262) (0.872) (1.000) 
Percentage secondary school 
attained among adults (log) 
- 1.225** 0.548 0.433 0.572 -0.026 0.671 0.444 
 (0.275) (0.627) (0.604) (1.167) (1.255) (0.6216 (0.704) 
Population size (log) - -0.028 4.448+ 2.865 -11.63 -2.474 3.653 4.268 
 (0.61) (2.398) (2.371) (9.178) (4.845) (2.323) (3.132) 
Trend - - - -0.031 - - - - 
   (0.022)     
Pension spending (log) - - - - - -
2.470* 
-
0.986** 
- 
     (1.033) (0.333)  
Active labor market policy  
spending (log) 
- - - - - -0.392 - -
0.576** 
     (0.298)  (0.191) 
Unemployment spending (log) - - - - - -0.317 - - 
     (0.210)   
Family allowances (log) - - - - - 0.824+ - - 
     (0.422)   
Health care spending (log) - - - - - 0.208 - - 
     (0.814)   
Housing spending (log) - - - - - -0.042 - - 
     (0.198)   
Other spending (log) - - - - - 0.912 - - 
     (0.667)   
         
Country fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-specific trends No No No No Yes No No No 
Observations 124 121 121 121 118 80 121 113 
No of countries 29 28 28 28 26 19 28 28 
R
2 
0.038 0.339 0.861 0.835 0.932 0.825 0.868 0.863 
R
2
 (within)
 
- - 0.258 0.118 0.665 0.571 0.293 0.376 
Note. Absolute standard errors in parentheses, +, * and ** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level, 
respectively. 
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Table 6. The effect of tax progressivity on student achievement 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Income tax rate progressivity 
-0.141* -0.009 -0.086* -0.074+ -0.074 -0.133** -0.025 0.018 
(0.058) (0.059) (0.042) (0.039) (0.057) (0.046) (0.050) (0.066) 
GDP per capita (log) 
- 1.297** 1.113* 1.031+ 2.118+ 0.001 1.399+ 4.794** 
 (0.226) (0.558) (0.523) (1.197) (0.258) (0.772) (1.534) 
Percentage secondary school 
attained among adults (log) 
- 0.945** -0.601 -0.51 1.013 1.403** -0.067 0.637 
 (0.336) (0.496) (0.449) (1.043) (0.285) (0.671) (1.258) 
Population size (log) 
- 0.109 0.654 -0.632 0.857 0.005 4.553 -1.245 
 (0.085) (1.245) (1.178) (10.023) (0.061) (2.789) (10.999) 
trend 
- - - -0.006 - - - - 
   (0.017)     
         
Country fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County specific trends No No No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 206 180 180 180 180 116 116 116 
No of countries 64 56 56 56 56 28 28 28 
Sample All All All All All OECD OECD OECD 
R
2 
0.029 0.387 0.958 0.952 0.983 0.280 0.855 0.939 
R
2
 (within)
 
- - 0.188 0.066 0.674 - 0.290 0.700 
Note. Absolute standard errors in parentheses, +, * and ** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level, 
respectively. 
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Table 7. Generosity of the welfare state: OECD countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
GDP per capita (log) 
0.766 -0.156 0.975 1.029 
(0.919) (1.340) (1.211) (0.963) 
Percentage secondary school attained 
among adults (log) 
0.707 0.747 1.578+ 0.357 
(0.658) (0.832) (0.846) (0.668) 
Population size (log) 
2.969 2.919 5.581+ 2.619 
(2.437) (3.523) (2.885) (2.518) 
Pension spending (log) -1.057* - - - 
 (0.502)    
Active labor market policy  - -0.544* - - 
spending (log)  (0.209)   
Unemployment spending (log) - - -0.112 - 
   (0.182)  
Health care spending (log) - - - 0.104 
    (0.590) 
Share of elderly (log) -0.783 - - -2.048* 
 (0.964)   (0.868) 
Unemployment rates - -0.027 0.000 - 
  (0.032) (0.037)  
     
Country fixed effects yes yes yes Yes 
Time fixed effects yes yes yes Yes 
Observations 110 110 113 110 
Countries 27 28 27 27 
R
2 
0.8632 0.8687 0.8479 0.8544 
R
2
 (within)
 
0.3328 0.3995 0.3079 0.2902 
F-test of joint significance 5.5078 3.458 0.2524 3.1086 
(p-value) 0.006 0.0372 0.7776 0.051 
Note. Absolute t-values in parentheses, +, * and ** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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Table 8. Post-1990 period and school quality measures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Gov. consumption expenditures, 
percent of GDP (log) 
-0.856 - - -0.924 - - -0.587 - - 
(0.569)   (0.637)   (0.550)   
Gov. social expenditures,  
percent of GDP (log) 
- -1.360* - - 
-
1.496** 
- - 
-
1.394** 
- 
 (0.537)   (0.563)   (0.511)  
Income tax rate progressivity 
- - -0.093+ - - -0.116* - - 
-
0.132** 
  (0.054)   (0.046)   (0.049) 
GDP per capita (log) 0.554 0.659 0.412 1.579* 0.152 2.005** 1.347* 1.216 0.901 
 (0.577) (1.008) (0.676) (0.616) (1.024) (0.697) (0.542) (1.030) (0.618) 
Percentage secondary school  
attained among adults (log) 
-0.498 0.658 -1.039 -1.168+ -0.168 -1.426+ 1.154* 0.571 -0.166 
(0.717) (1.077) (0.878) (0.646) (0.868) (0.768) (0.533) (0.794) (0.725) 
Population size (log) 
2.836+ 4.303 1.579 1.178 6.258 0.906 1.647 2.266 0.628 
(1.557) (4.117) (1.771) (1.516) (4.087) (1.466) (1.190) (3.189) (1.363) 
Primary education expenditures  
per pupil, percent of GDP (log) 
- - - 0.412 0.433 0.579* - - - 
   (0.295) (0.341) (0.287)    
Pupil-teacher ratio in primary 
education 
- - - - - - -0.005 0.048 -0.003 
      (0.032) (0.031) (0.033) 
          
Sample All OECD All All OECD All All OECD All 
Time period 1990 - 2003 yes yes yes no no no no no no 
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Time fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 177 102 163 166 104 152 185 103 160 
Countries 58 28 56 52 27 50 58 27 55 
R
2 
0.9617 0.8791 0.9626 0.9558 0.8740 0.9609 0.9484 0.8833 0.9645 
R
2
 (within)
 0.2251 0.3290 0.1744 0.2377 0.3010 0.3161 0.2462 0.3398 0.2094 
F-test (social spending,  
school quality) 
   1.5582 3.749 4.3742 0.5928 5.2155 3.9535 
(p-value)    0.2156 0.029 0.0155 0.5545 0.0081 0.0226 
Note. Absolute t-values in parentheses, + * and ** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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Appendix Table A1. Participating countries and within-country variation 
 
Number of 
relevant 
international 
tests 
Mean value 
dependent 
variable 
Difference between maximum and minimum values 
observed in the regression sample 
 
Dependent 
variable 
Log(government 
consumption) 
Log(Social 
expenditures) 
Income tax 
progressivity 
Albania 1 -3.17 0 0 - - 
Argentina 1 -2.86 0 0 - 0 
Armenia 1 -2.02 0 0 - - 
Australia 6 0.13 0.89 0.08 0.34 2 
Austria 3 0.18 0.57 0.10 0.05 0 
Bahrain 1 -3.81 0 0 - 0 
Belgium 4 0.12 0.57 0.10 0.05 1 
Botswana 1 -5.74 0 0 - 0 
Brazil 3 -4.45 1.93 0.01 - 0 
Bulgaria 4 -0.77 2.35 0.22 - 5 
Canada 7 0.11 1.05 0.24 0.34 2 
Chile 2 -4.07 0.87 0.11 - 0.4 
China 3 1.19 1.14 0.02 - 1.6 
Colombia 1 -5.46 0 0 - 0 
Cyprus 3 -2.37 1.01 0.04 - 3 
Czech Republic 4 0.47 1.36 0.11 0.15 2 
Denmark 3 -0.84 1.57 0.05 0.11 1 
Egypt, 1 -4.03 0 0 - 0 
Estonia 1 0.55 0 0 - 0 
Finland 5 0.36 1.31 0.16 0.20 1.6 
France 5 -0.09 1.29 0.08 0.27 2.4 
Germany 3 -0.44 0.49 0.03 0.04 2 
Ghana 1 -9.32 0 0 - 0 
Greece 3 -1.51 0.49 0.14 0.10 0 
Hong Kong 6 0.52 2.38 0.42 - 0 
Hungary 7 0.57 2.49 0.12 0.10 5 
Iceland 3 -0.71 1.73 0.16 0.20 2 
Indonesia 3 -3.39 0.68 0.21 - 1.2 
Iran 3 -3.19 0.72 0.28 - 5.6 
Ireland 4 -0.49 1.27 0.22 0.18 2 
Israel 6 -1.04 1.49 0.37 - 3.4 
Italy 6 -1.00 1.60 0.12 0.20 5.8 
Japan 6 1.49 1.00 0.25 0.54 3 
Jordan 3 -3.21 1.67 0.43 - 0 
Korea 6 1.24 1.94 0.18 0.81 4.2 
Kuwait 1 -4.95 0 0 - - 
Latvia 4 -1.05 1.32 0.16 - 2 
Lebanon 1 -4.05 0 0 - - 
Lithuania 3 -1.37 1.82 0.18 - 0 
Luxembourg 3 -1.35 1.26 0.17 0.22 0 
Macedonia 3 -2.68 0.82 0.08 - - 
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Malaysia 2 -0.57 0.07 0.35 - 0.4 
Mexico 2 -2.88 0.68 0.11 0.16 0 
Moldova 2 -1.99 0.32 0.64 - - 
Morocco 2 -5.41 1.19 0.09 - 0.2 
Mozambique 1 -8.79 0 0 - - 
Netherlands 6 0.79 0.83 0.12 0.27 2.6 
New Zealand 6 -0.28 1.39 0.17 0.15 1.8 
Nigeria 1 -2.58 0 0 - 0 
Norway 4 -0.60 1.09 0.18 0.12 2.2 
Peru 1 -4.77 0 0 - 0 
Philippines 3 -4.91 1.68 0.62 - 0 
Poland 3 -0.39 0.77 0.04 0.08 0 
Portugal 4 -2.03 1.47 0.15 0.47 1 
Romania 3 -1.86 0.50 0.88 - 4 
Russian Federation 5 -0.16 1.65 0.27 - 2 
Saudi Arabia 1 -5.76 0 0 - - 
Serbia and Montenegro 2 -1.44 1.11 0 - - 
Singapore 4 1.71 4.40 0.39 - 1 
Slovak Republic 3 0.12 0.71 0.06 0.09 1 
Slovenia 3 0.04 1.23 0.04 - 0 
South Africa 3 -8.56 2.00 0.08 - 1.4 
Spain 4 -1.03 0.78 0.05 0.06 4 
Swaziland 1 -2.50 0 0 - - 
Sweden 5 -0.30 1.17 0.12 0.13 5.6 
Switzerland 4 0.38 1.15 0.07 0.35 1 
Thailand 6 -1.37 1.76 0.29 - 1 
Tunisia 2 -3.33 1.44 0.01 - 0 
Turkey 2 -2.59 0.54 0.11 0 0.4 
United Kingdom 7 -0.28 1.35 0.19 0.13 6.2 
U.S.A. 7 -0.73 1.15 0.18 0.20 4.2 
Uruguay 1 -2.33 0 0 - 0 
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Figure 1. Kernel density of student achievement  
 
a) “Core” country observations      b) All observations    
    
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Country-specific development in relative student achievement.    
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Figure 3. Kernel density of change in student achievement 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Country-specific development in social expenditures as share of GDP 
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